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Do	UK	universities	collude	in	ways	that	inhibit
genuine	competition?
In	July	2017	a	former	minister,	Andrew	Adonis,	suggested	that	UK	universities	might	be	running	a	cartel:	‘There
appears	to	be	strong	prima	facie	evidence	of	a	cartel.	It’s	short-changing	a	number	of	students.	They	are	paying
for	more	than	the	actual	cost	of	their	degree.’	In	this	blog	post	we	attempt	to	clarify	the	situation.	Do	universities
compete?	Are	students	paying	too	much?	Is	this	because	of	a	cartel?
Is	the	higher	education	market	competitive?
We	are	in	no	doubt	that	in	many	respects	British	universities	(and	individual	academics)	operate	in	a	competitive
environment.	The	most	prestigious	universities	compete	in	a	truly	global	market,	as	do	individual	academics.
Students	also	increasingly	compete	across,	not	just	countries	but,	continents	for	places	at	these	universities.
However,	this	is	not	the	same	as	saying	there	is	a	competitive	market	for	teaching.	Nor	does	it	imply	students
receive	value	for	money.
In	our	recent	paper	we	found	no	relationship	between	how	much	teaching	students	receive	and	the	price	they	pay
–	an	observation	which	is	hard	to	reconcile	with	the	view	that	this	market	is	competitive.	We	also	found	marked
differences	between	disciplines	in	how	much	teaching	students	receive	during	the	three	years	of	their	degree,	as
Figure	1	shows.
Figure	1.	Distribution	of	Total	Equivalent	Adjusted	Contact	Hours	(TEACH)	by	subject
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Source:	Huxley	et	al,	2017
The	findings	in	our	full	paper	are	not	ipso	facto	evidence	of	a	cartel,	however	it	does	provide	prima	facie	evidence
that	universities	possess	some	form	of	market	power.
Market	power
The	UK	government’s	view	is	that	the	absence	of	competition	is	the	result	of	government	rather	than	market
failure.	Market	power	is	the	result	of	number	controls	and	regulatory	barriers	to	entry	–	and	policies	to	address
these	concerns	were	put	forward	in	2011	and	2016	white	papers.	In	the	absence	of	quantity	and	price	controls	it
would	certainly	appear	that	the	UK’s	approximately	150	universities	should	provide	robust	competition.
Unfortunately	statements	of	this	kind	are	based	on	a	naive	understanding	of	what	determines	the	‘intensity	of
price	competition’.	We	know	from	the	application	of	game	theory	to	industrial	organisation	that	the	number	of
firms	in	an	industry	is	a	misleading	indicator:	competition	depends	less	on	the	number	of	firms	than	on	how	those
firms	interact.
In	health	care	markets	Martin	Gaynor,	Carol	Propper,	and	others	have	shown	that	the	welfare	of	patients
depends	on	precisely	how	hospitals	compete	and	this	requires	a	detailed	understanding	of	how	the	market	works
and	a	sophisticated	approach	to	regulation.	By	contrast	higher	education	policy	has	been	driven	by	a	‘Chicago
School’	belief	that	the	removal	of	number	controls	will	on	its	own	solve	the	problem.	The	reform	of	higher
education	markets	must	be	informed	by	recent	developments	in	the	theory	of	industrial	organisation	coupled	with
a	willingness	to	regulate.
Cartels																																																	
Cartels	are	groups	of	independent	firms	in	the	same	market	who	increase	their	collective	profits	by	explicit
agreements	to	collude.	This	can	take	the	form	of	fixing	the	price	or	quality	of	the	good	or	service	they	provide.	In
the	context	of	universities,	this	would	require	VCs	to	actively	discuss	and	agree	to	set	their	fee	at	a	specific
amount	–	or	agree	to	offer	minimal	teaching.	Given	the	government	set	price	cap	of	£9k,	collusion	over	teaching
offerings	would	be	our	concern.
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Even	Andrew	Adonis	will	probably	admit	that	explicit	collusion	between	high	and	low	ranked	universities	is
unlikely	–	for	one	thing,	they	are	operating	in	different	markets.	Vice	chancellors	of	universities	in	the	same
market	do	meet	and	discuss	university	operations,	and	there	are	several	mission	groups	(e.g.	Million+,	Russell
Group,	etc)	which	facilitate	this	“positive	dialogue	and	discussion	between	[university]	leaders”.	But	we	are
doubtful	that	these	bodies	fix	prices	or	agree	how	best	to	short-change	students	on	teaching.	Nor	do	they	need	to
–	the	informational	market	failure	renders	explicit	collusion	unnecessary.
Information
It	has	long	been	understood	that	lack	of	information	can	lead	to	market	power.	If	students	can’t	observe	what	is
being	offered,	they	can’t	make	informed	choices.	Instead	they	must	take	the	plunge	with	their	eyes	closed.
Universities	were	lucky:	it	turned	out	graduates	are	in	such	high	demand	that	the	return	from	studying	on	your
own,	with	minimal	teaching,	is	more	than	the	lifetime	repayments	made	on	a	£27k	tuition	fee	loan.	This	is	what	we
believe	is	going	on	–	not	strictly	a	cartel	–	but	students	are	being	exploited.	If	the	differences	in	teaching	we	have
observed	between	history	and	physics	had	been	precisely	measured	and	therefore	observable	we	think	it	is
unlikely	that	a	uniform	price	could	have	been	set	across	all	subjects.
Without	being	able	compare	the	teaching	offered	by	different	HEIs,	students	can	only	make	choices	on	what	they
can	observe.	Pam	Tatlow	(the	head	of	the	Million+	lobby)	encouraged	students	to	ignore	our	insistence	on
making	information	on	teaching	available,	saying	it	was	‘too	complicated’.	It	is	not.	Students	are	entitled	to	this
information	to	ensure	they	receive	value	for	money.	They	need	to	be	able	to	verify	that	universities	have	kept	their
side	of	the	bargain.	As	the	Browne	review	put	it:	when	students	‘spend	more	[they	should]	get	more’.
We	have	been	trying	to	highlight	this	informational	market	failure	for	some	time	(e.g.	here	and	here),	but
unfortunately	the	coalition	government	paid	no	attention.	So	we	decided	to	collect	the	information	ourselves	to
show	it	could	be	done.	The	current	government	has	begun	to	address	the	problem	and	asked	HEFCE	to
investigate	teaching	intensity.	HEFCE	even	asked	to	licence	our	data	because	they	had	never	collected	data	on
teaching	arrangements	at	British	universities.	It	is	not	just	prospective	students	who	know	nothing	about	how
much	we	teach	–	even	the	body	responsible	for	monitoring	the	performance	of	the	sector	has	none	of	the	relevant
information!
So	is	there	a	cartel?
The	introduction	of	tuition	fees	was	supported	by	politicians	because	for	once	principle	trumped	expediency.
Unfortunately	universities	failed	to	honour	their	side	of	the	bargain,	and	the	information	portal	contains	none	of
the	information	intended	by	Browne.	The	result	is	that	because	students	do	not	have	access	to	readily	available
information	which	can	be	used	to	compare	the	teaching	across	universities,	the	current	arrangements	are	just	as
bad	for	students	as	if	there	was	a	cartel.	The	lesson	is	simple:	If	universities	behave	like	monopolists	they	must
be	regulated	like	monopolists.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Class	Size	at	University,	in	Fiscal	Studies	–	The	Journal	of
Applied	Public	Economics,	July	2017.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
Featured	image	credit:	LSE	lecture,	by	Catholic	Church	England	and	Wales,	under	a	CC-BY-NC-SA-
2.0	licence
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